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by: Sumit Ganguly
Publisher: Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002
Reviewed by: NK Pant
INDO-PAK STANDOFF - ORIGINS AND DANGEROUS MANIFESTATIONSAt a time when the Indo-Pakistan relations have hit rock bottom, Sumit Ganguly throws valuable light on the deeper origins of continual hostility between the two South Asian neighbours who have been locked in seemingly unending conflict ever since 1947. The author, Professor of Asian Studies and Government at the University of Texas at Austin, in his meticulously researched work provides a detailed account of the four wars and several crises that have punctuated bilateral bitterness in the sub-continent. While the Kashmir dispute dominates the subject, the topics of nuclearisation of the sub-continent, limited war of Kargil and repercussions of 9/11 terrorist strike in the US have also been subjected to author’s detailed examination. According to the book, in 1947, two divergent conceptions of state building animated the Indian and Pakistani nationalist movements. The Indian nationalist movement, under the aegis of the Indian National Congress agreed on the need for a secular and democratic post-Independent India. This vision fundamentally challenged Jinnah’s ‘two nation’ hypothesis, which necessitated the creation of a Muslim homeland amid remnants of the British Indian empire in South Asia. The Congress and the Muslim League espoused different ideological goals which were diametrically opposed. At the time of Independence, the princely states were expected to merge into one of the two nascent nations but the Muslim majority Kashmir’s Maharaja Hari Singh refused to accede to either one. Meanwhile in October 1947, Pakistani army backed tribal marauders launched a large-scale attack on the state. As the marauders reached the outskirts of Srinagar, the panicky Maharaja appealed New Delhi for military assistance. India agreed for prompt help with the condition that the princely ruler signs the Instrument of Accession. Indian troops were air-dashed to Srinagar on October 27 and succeeded in arresting the advance of the Pakistani backed forces. As the war dragged on, India referred the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council where it got mired in the cold war politics wherein the victim and aggressor were put in the same plane. As the dispute continued till mid 1965, Pakistan which considered it was incomplete without Kashmir, had not reconciled to J&K’s accession to India. In August 1965, they embarked on Operation Gibralter by infiltrating their troops and irregulars disguised as locals into Kashmir. But their grand hope of quickly fomenting a rebellion in the valley failed to materialise. Yet Pakistanis were foolish enough to launch ‘Operation Grand Slam’ which was nothing but a full scale attack across the international border in Jammu region. In order to relieve Pakistani pressure on J&K, India had to open new war front in Punjab almost reaching the outskirts of Lahore. The brief but fierce war failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The UN Security Council in a resolution on September 20 called for ceasefire that was immediately implemented by India with Pakistanis on the tow. The origins of the 1971 war were markedly different from those of the two previous Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Despite the putative bond of Islam, significant differences existed between East and West Pakistan. President General Yahya Khan had ordered a brutal military crack down on civilians in East Pakistan in March 1971. Thousands were butchered and about ten million fled to India as refugees. This enormous human inundation provided India an important alibi weigh option of using force to change the political dispensation in East Pakistan where the local population had risen in revolt against West Pakistani domination. The war formally started with a pre-emptive attack by Pakistan on India’s northern air bases on December, 1971. But the attack invited massive retaliation from the IAF the very next day. The Indian forces advanced rapidly in the east and reached Dacca within a short period forcing the Pakistani General Niazi to surrender along with his forces. After the dawn of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan signed the Simla agreement in 1972. From this year onwards till 1983, various governments in New Delhi showed skill, tact, and intelligence in dealing with the internal dimensions of Kashmir problem. From 1984 onwards they returned to the extraordinary clumsiness, thoughtlessness and downright deceit which ultimately culminated in an ethno-religious insurgency in December 1989 ‘that once again gave Pakistan a chance to pry Kashmir out of the Indian Union.’ In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in early eighties, President Zia-ul-Haq’s dexterous diplomacy ‘turned a potentially adverse strategic milieu into a strategic near windfall for his regime.’ As the American arms started pouring in Pakistan, Indian relation with it western neighbour started deteriorating. An emboldened Pakistan started encroachments into Siachen glacier prompting India to occupy the icy heights thus opening another battlefield. The relations further strained and almost brought the two countries on the verge of war in 1990. In the meantime Islamabad went full steam in developing its nuclear armoury. In May 1998, when New Delhi carried out nuclear tests, Islamabad immediately followed suit. Between April and June 1999, the two neighbours plunged into another war in Kargil along the LoC in Kashmir as Pakistani troops were found to have covertly intruded into the Indian territory. Indian army assisted by the IAF went into action to evict the intruders without crossing the LoC thereby winning respect from the international community. The author feels "Pakistani behaviour in precipitating this conflict conformed closely to the expectations of the ‘stability/instability paradox.’ This proposition holds that nuclear weapons do contribute to stability at one level, for fear of nuclear escalation. Simultaneously, however, they create incentives for conventional conflicts in peripheral areas as long as either side does not breach certain shared thresholds." The book also discusses sudden reinvigoration of American interest in the sub-continental politics following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. Prior to September 11, ‘Pakistan had been consigned to the status of a virtual pariah state in the international system’ but 9/11 changed all that. Musharraf’s decision to ally his country with the US war efforts against Al Qaeda and Taliban ‘stemmed less from his sympathy for the American cause and more from exigencies confronting the beleaguered regime.’ The Taliban has been destroyed but the vexed question of Kashmir persists. The author also holds the US responsible for propping up Pakistani war machine ‘since the military in Pakistan has played a critical role in fomenting Indo-Pakistani discord.’ According to the book there is little likelihood of any breakthrough in bilateral relations in near future. Any resolution of conflict will require patience, skill, and long-term commitment – attributes that have thus far been lacking in politicians and decision-makers on both sides of the border. ‘Conflict Unending’ is in fact a political scientist’s analysis of a highly complex problem with its deep roots in politico-religious history of the sub-continent. Sumit Ganguly’s brilliant and deftly handled epilogue makes an interesting reading. It should help in removing the cobwebs of confusion on the dangerous discord amongst the readers interested in military matters and international affairs. |
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